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T
he unusual combination of more rapid
output growth and lower inflation from
1995 to 2000 has touched off a strenuous
debate among economists about whether
improvements in U.S. economic perfor-
mance can be sustained. This debate has
intensified with the recession that began in March
2001, and the economic impacts of the events of
September 11 are still imperfectly understood. Both
factors add to the considerable uncertainties about
future growth that currently face decision makers
in both the public and private sectors. 
The range of informed opinion can be illustrated
by the projections of labor productivity growth
reported at the August 2001 Symposium on
Economic Policy for the Information Economy,
organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City. J. Bradford Delong, professor of economics
at the University of California at Berkeley, and
Lawrence H. Summers, president of Harvard Univer-
sity and former Secretary of the Treasury, offered
the most optimistic perspective with a projection of
labor productivity growth of 3 percent per year.1 A
more pessimistic tone was set by Martin N. Baily
(2001), former chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, who speculated that labor pro-
ductivity would average near the low end of the 2 to
2.5 percent per year range.
This uncertainty is only magnified by the obser-
vation that recent productivity estimates remain
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surprisingly strong for an economy in recession. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (2002) estimates
that business sector productivity grew 1.9 percent
per year during 2001 while business sector output
grew only 0.9 percent per year as the U.S. economy
slowed during the 2001 recession. Growth of both
labor productivity and output, however, appears
considerably below trend rates, partially reflecting
the collapse of investment spending that began
toward the end of 2000, continued through 2001,
and seems likely to be maintained well into 2002.
This paper reviews the most recent evidence and
quantifies the proximate sources of growth using
an augmented growth accounting framework that
allows us to focus on information technology (IT).
Despite the downward revision to gross domestic
product (GDP) and investment in some IT assets
in the annual GDP revisions by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) in July 2001, we con-
clude that the U.S. productivity revival remains
largely intact and that IT has played a central role.
For example, the capital deepening contribution
from computer hardware, software, and telecom-
munications equipment to labor productivity
growth for the 1995–2000 period exceeded the con-
tribution from all other capital assets. We also find
increases in total factor productivity (TFP) in both
the IT-producing sectors and elsewhere in the econ-
omy although the non-IT component is smaller than
in earlier estimates.2 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
years. We employ the same methodology and sum-
marize it briefly. Then we present projections of the
trend growth of output and labor productivity for
the next decade and compare these with projec-
tions based on alternative methodologies.  
Reviewing the Historical Record
T
he methodology for analyzing growth sources
is based on the production possibility frontier
introduced by Jorgenson (1996, 27–28). This
framework captures substitution between invest-
ment and consumption goods on the output side
and between capital and labor inputs on the input
side. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Jorgenson
(2001) have recently used the production possibility
frontier to measure the contributions of information
technology to U.S. economic growth and the growth
of labor productivity. 
The production possibility frontier. In the
production possibility frontier, output (Y) consist of
consumption goods (C) and investment goods (I)
while inputs consist of capital services (K) and labor
input (L). Output can be further decomposed into
IT investment goods—computer hardware (Ic), com-
puter software (Is), communications equipment (Im),
and all other non-IT output (Yn). Capital services
can be similarly decomposed into the capital service
flows from hardware (Kc), software (Ks), communi-
cations equipment (Km), and all other capital ser-
vices (Kn).2 The input function (X) is augmented
by total factor productivity (A). The production
possibility frontier can be represented as
(1) Y(Y n, Ic, Is, Im) = A × X(Kn, Kc, Ks, Km, L).
Under the standard assumptions of competitive
product and factor markets and constant returns to
scale, equation 1 can be transformed into an equation
that accounts for the sources of economic growth:
(2)
where ∆x = xt – xt–1, w – denotes the average output
shares, v – denotes the average input shares of the










L=1. The shares are averaged over
periods t and t – 1. We refer to the share-weighted
growth rates in equation 2 as the contributions of
the inputs and outputs.
Average labor productivity (ALP) is defined as
the ratio of output to hours worked, so that ALP =
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The paper then turns to the future of U.S. pro-
ductivity growth, concluding that the projections of
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), prepared more than
eighteen months ago, are largely on target. Our new
base-case projection of trend labor productivity
growth for the next decade is 2.21 percent per year,
only slightly below the average of the 1995–2000
period of 2.36 percent per year. The projection of
output growth for the next decade, however, is only
3.31 percent per year, compared with the 1995–2000
average of 4.6 percent, as a result of slower projected
growth in hours worked.
Projecting growth for periods as long as a decade
is fraught with uncertainty. Our pessimistic projec-
tion of labor productivity growth is only 1.33 percent
per year, while our optimistic projection is 2.92 per-
cent. For output growth, the range is from 2.43 per-
cent in the pessimistic case to 4.02 percent in the
optimistic. These ranges result from fundamental
uncertainties about future technological changes in
the production of information technology equipment
and related investment patterns, which Jorgenson
(2001) traced to changes in the product cycle of
semiconductors, the most important IT component. 
The starting point for projecting U.S. output
growth is the projection of future growth of the labor
force. The 2.24 percent per year growth of hours
worked from 1995 to 2000 is not likely to be sustain-
able because labor force growth for the next decade
will average only 1.1 percent. An abrupt slowdown in
growth of hours worked would have reduced output
growth by 1.14 percent, even if labor productivity
growth had continued unabated. We estimate that
labor productivity growth from 1995 to 2000 also
exceeded its sustainable rate, however, leading to an
additional decline of 0.15 percent in the trend rate of
output growth so that the base-case scenario projects
output growth of 3.31 percent for the next decade.
The next section reviews the historical record,
extending the estimates of Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000) to incorporate data for 1999 and 2000 and
revised estimates of economic growth for earlier
Our new base-case projection of trend labor
productivity growth for the next decade is
2.21 percent per year, only slightly below
the average of the 1995–2000 period of
2.36 percent per year.1. DeLong and Summers (2001, 21) do not actually provide a point estimate but state that “it is certainly possible—if not prob-
able—that when U.S. growth resumes, trend productivity will grow as fast or faster than it did in the late 1990s.” The 3 per-
cent estimate is attributed to Summers in a review of the symposium in The Economist, September 8, 2001.
2. Note that the output and capital service flow concepts include the service flows from residential structures and consumer
durables. See Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) for details.
3. Output shares include expenditures on consumption, investment, government, and net exports for each IT asset. Note that
the use of the price dual to measure technological change assumes competitive markets in IT production. As pointed out by
Aizcorbe (2002) and Hobijn (2001), the market for many IT components, notably semiconductors and software, is not per-
fectly competitive, and part of the drop in prices may reflect oligopolistic behavior rather than technological progress.
Aizcorbe, however, concludes that declining markups account for only about one-tenth of the measured declines in the price
of microprocessors in the 1990s, so the use of prices to measure technological progress seems a reasonable approximation.
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y = Y/H, where the lower-case variable (y) denotes
output (Y) per hour (H). Equation 2 can be rewritten






Km and ∆lnkIT is the growth of
all IT capital services per hour.
Equation 3 decomposes ALP growth into three
sources. The first is capital deepening, defined as
the contribution of capital services per hour,
which is decomposed into non-IT and IT compo-
nents. The interpretation of capital deepening is
that additional capital makes workers more produc-
tive in proportion to the capital share. The second
factor is labor quality improvement, defined as
the contribution of labor input per hour worked.
This factor reflects changes in the composition of
the workforce and raises labor productivity in pro-
portion to the labor share. The third source is total
factor productivity growth, which raises ALP growth
point for point.
In a fully developed sectoral production model,
like that of Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002), TFP
growth reflects the productivity contributions of
individual sectors. It is difficult, however, to create
the detailed industry data needed to measure
industry-level productivity in a timely and accurate
manner. The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
(2001), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), and Oliner and
Sichel (2000, 2002) have employed the price dual of
industry-level productivity to generate estimates of
TFP growth in the production of IT assets.
Intuitively, the idea underlying the dual approach
is that declines in relative prices for IT investment
goods reflect fundamental technological change
and productivity growth in the IT-producing
industries. We weight these relative price declines
by the shares in output of each of the IT invest-
ment goods in order to estimate the contribution
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IT represents IT’s average share of output,
∆lnAIT is IT-related productivity growth, and
u –
IT∆ln AIT is the contribution to aggregate TFP from
IT production. ∆ln An reflects the contribution to
aggregate TFP growth from the rest of the economy,
which includes TFP gains in other industries as well
as reallocation effects as inputs and outputs are
shifted among sectors.
We estimate the contribution to aggregate TFP
growth from IT production, u –
IT∆ AIT, by estimating
output shares and productivity growth rates for
computer hardware, software, and communications
equipment. Productivity growth for each investment
good is measured as the negative of the rate of price
decline relative to the price change of capital and
labor inputs. The output shares are the final expen-
ditures on these investment goods, divided by total
output.3 This estimate likely understates IT output
because it ignores the production of intermediate
goods, but this omission is relatively small. Finally,
the non-IT contribution to aggregate TFP growth,
∆An, is estimated as a residual from equation 4. 
Data. This section briefly summarizes the data
required to implement equations 1–4; more detailed
descriptions are available in Ho and Jorgenson (1999)
and the appendices of Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
The output measure is somewhat broader than the
one used in the official labor productivity statistics,
published by the BLS (2001a, 2001b) and employed
by Gordon (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002).
Our definition of the private U.S. economy includes
the nonprofit sector and imputed capital service flows
from residential housing and consumer durables.
The imputations raise the measure of private output
by $778 billion in current dollars, or 9 percent of nom-
inal private GDP, in 2000.
The output estimates reflect the revisions to the
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
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rates is the growth rate of capital quality, KQ. As
firms substitute among assets by investing relatively
more in assets with relatively high marginal products,
capital quality increases.
Labor input is a quantity index of hours worked
that takes into account the heterogeneity of the work
force among sex, employment class, age, and educa-
tion levels. The weights used to construct the index
are the compensation of the various types of work-
ers. In the same way as for capital, we define growth
in labor quality as the difference between the growth
rate of aggregate labor input and hours worked:
(6) ∆lnLQ = ∆lnL – ∆lnH,
where LQ is labor quality, L is the labor input index,
and H is hours worked. As firms substitute among
hours worked by hiring relatively more highly skilled
and highly compensated workers, labor quality rises.
The labor data incorporate the Censuses of
Population for 1970, 1980, and 1990, the annual
Current Population Surveys (CPS), and the NIPA.
This study takes total hours worked for private
domestic employees directly from the NIPA
(Table 6.9c), self-employed hours worked for the
nonfarm business sector from the BLS, and self-
employed hours worked in the farm sector from
the Department of Agriculture.
Results. Table 1 reports the estimates of the
components of equation 2, the sources of economic
growth. For the period as a whole, output grew approx-
imately 3.6 percent per year. Capital input made the
largest contribution to growth of 1.8 percentage
points, followed by approximately 1.2 percentage
points from labor input. Less than 20 percent of
output growth, 0.7 percentage point, directly reflects
TFP. These results are consistent with the other
recent growth accounting decompositions like CEA
(2001), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), and Oliner
and Sichel (2000, 2002). 
The data also show the substantial acceleration in
output growth after 1995. Output growth increased
from 3 percent per year for the 1973–95 period to
4.6 percent for the 1995–2000 period, reflecting large
increases in IT and non-IT investment goods. On
the input side, more rapid capital accumulation con-
tributed 0.84 percentage point to the post-1995 accel-
eration while faster growth of labor input contributed
0.30 percentage point and accelerated TFP growth
the remaining 0.47 percentage point. The contribu-
tion of capital input from IT increased from 0.36 per-
centage point per year for the 1973–95 period to 0.85
for the 1995–2000 period, exceeding the increased
contributions of all other forms of capital.
released in July 2001. These revisions included a
downward adjustment to software investment as
well as a new quality-adjusted price index for local
area networks. Both of these revisions are incorpo-
rated into the estimates of IT investment. 
The capital service estimates are based on the
Tangible Wealth Survey, published by the BEA and
described in Herman (2001). This survey includes
data on business investment and consumer durable
purchases for the U.S. economy through 2000. We
construct capital stocks from the investment data
by the perpetual inventory method and assume that
the effective capital stock for each asset is the aver-
age of the current and lagged estimates. The data
on tangible assets from the BEA are augmented
with inventory data to form the measure of the
reproducible capital stock. The total capital stock
also includes land and inventories.
Finally, we estimate capital service flows by mul-
tiplying rental prices and effective capital stocks, as
originally proposed by Jorgenson and Griliches
(1996). The estimates incorporate asset-specific
differences in taxes, asset prices, service lives, and
depreciation rates. This method is essential for
understanding the productive impact of IT invest-
ment because IT assets differ dramatically from
other assets in rates of decline of asset prices and
depreciation rates.
The difference between the growth in aggregate
capital service flows and effective capital stocks is
referred to as the growth in capital quality. That is,
(5) ∆lnKQ = ∆lnK – ∆lnZ,
where KQ is capital quality, K is capital service flow,
and Z is the effective capital stock. The aggregate
capital stock, Z, is a quantity index over seventy dif-
ferent effective capital stocks plus land and inven-
tories using investment goods prices as weights.
The aggregate flow of capital services, K, is a quan-
tity index of the same stocks using rental (or ser-
vice) prices as weights. The difference in growth
Changes in the underlying trend growth rate
of productivity are likely to be permanent, but
cyclical factors such as strong output growth
or extraordinarily rapid investment are more
likely to be temporary.5 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
The last four rows in Table 1 present an alter-
native decomposition of the contribution of capi-
tal and labor inputs using equations 5 and 6. Here,
the contribution of capital and labor reflects the
contributions from capital quality and capital stock
as well as labor quality and hours worked, respec-
tively, as
(7)
Table 1 shows that the revival of output growth
after 1995 can be attributed to two forces. First, a
massive substitution toward IT assets in response to
accelerating IT price declines is reflected in the ris-
ing contribution of capital quality while the growth of
capital stock lagged considerably behind the growth
of output. Second, the growth of hours worked
surged as the growth of labor quality declined. A fall
in the unemployment rate and an increase in labor
force participation drew more workers with relatively
low marginal products into the workforce. We employ
equation 7 in projecting sustainable growth of output
and labor productivity in the next section.
∆∆∆ ∆
∆∆
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Table 2 presents estimates of the sources of ALP
growth, as in equations 3 and 4. For the period as a
whole, growth in ALP accounted for nearly 60 per-
cent of output growth, due to annual capital deep-
ening of 1.13 percentage points, improvement of
labor quality of 0.28 percentage point, and TFP
growth of 0.66 percentage point. Growth in hours
worked of 1.54 percentage points per year accounted
for the remaining 40 percent of output growth.
Looking more closely at the post-1995 period, one
sees that labor productivity increased by 0.92 per-
centage points per year from 1.44 for the 1973–95
period to 2.36 for the 1995–2000 period, and hours
worked increased by 0.68 percentage points from an
annual rate of 1.55 for the 1973–95 period to 2.24 for
the 1995–2000 period. The labor productivity growth
revival reflects more rapid capital deepening of 0.52
percentage point and accelerated TFP growth of
0.47 percentage point per year; the contribution of
labor quality declined. Nearly all of the increase in
capital deepening was from IT assets with only a
small increase from other assets. Finally, we esti-
mate that improved productivity in the production
of IT-related assets contributed 0.27 percentage
1995–2000
less
1959–2000 1959–73 1973–95 1995–2000 1973–95
Growth in private domestic output (Y) 3.61 4.24 2.99 4.60 1.61
Contribution of selected output components
Other output (Yn) 3.30 4.10 2.68 3.79 1.12
Computer investment (Ic) 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.20
Software investment (Is) 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.18
Communications investment (Im) 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.11
Contribution of capital and CD services (K) 1.80 1.99 1.54 2.38 0.84
Other (Kn) 1.44 1.81 1.18 1.52 0.34
Computers (Kc) 0.19 0.09 0.20 0.47 0.28
Software (Ks) 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.25 0.16
Communications (Km) 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.06
Contribution of labor (L) 1.16 1.12 1.12 1.42 0.30
Aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) 0.66 1.13 0.33 0.80 0.47
Contribution of capital and CD quality 0.47 0.34 0.41 1.09 0.69
Contribution of capital and CD stock 1.33 1.65 1.14 1.28 0.15
Contribution of labor quality 0.28 0.39 0.23 0.17 –0.06
Contribution of labor hours 0.88 0.73 0.89 1.26 0.37
Note: A contribution of an output or input is defined as the share-weighted, real growth rate. “CD” stands for consumer durables.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEA, BLS, Census Bureau, and other data
TABLE 1
Sources of Growth in Private Domestic Output, 1959–20006 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
different from BLS (2001a) because of the differ-
ent methods of estimating the wage-demographic
relationships and our use of only the March CPS
data as opposed to the monthly CPS data used by
BLS. These differences ultimately appear in our
estimated contribution to TFP from non-IT sources
because this cannot be observed directly without
detailed industry data, and we therefore estimate
it as a residual.
Projecting Productivity Growth
W
hile there is little disagreement about the
resurgence of ALP growth after 1995, there
has been considerable debate about whether this
is permanent or temporary. Changes in the under-
lying trend growth rate of productivity are likely
to be permanent, but cyclical factors such as strong
output growth or extraordinarily rapid investment
are more likely to be temporary. This distinction is
crucial to understanding the sources of the recent
productivity revival and projecting future produc-
tivity growth. 
This section presents projections of trend rates
of growth for output and labor productivity over the
next decade, abstracting from business cycle fluc-
tuations. The key assumptions are that output and
the reproducible capital stock will grow at the same
rate and that labor hours will grow at the same rate
as the labor force.4 These features are character-
istic of the U.S. and most industrialized economies
over periods of time longer than a typical business
cycle. For example, U.S. output growth averaged
3.6 percent per year for the 1959–2000 period while
our measure of the reproducible capital stock grew
3.9 percent per year.5
point to aggregate TFP growth while improved pro-
ductivity growth in the rest of the economy con-
tributed the remaining 0.2 percentage point. These
results suggest that IT had a substantial role in the
revival of labor productivity growth through both
capital deepening and TFP channels.
Our estimate of the magnitude of the productiv-
ity revival is somewhat lower than that reported in
earlier studies by BLS (2001a), Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000), and Oliner and Sichel (2000). These studies
were based on data reported prior to the July 2001
revision of the NIPA, which substantially lowered
GDP growth in 1999 and 2000. Our estimates of the
productivity revival are also lower than the estimates
in BLS (2001b), however, which does include the
July 2001 revisions in GDP.
BLS (2001b) reports business sector ALP growth
of 2.68 percentage points for 1995–2000 and 1.45
for 1973–95, an increase of 1.23 percentage points,
compared to our estimated acceleration of 0.92 per-
centage point. This divergence results from a com-
bination of a slower acceleration of our broader
concept of output and our estimates of more rapid
growth in hours worked. BLS (2001b), for example,
reports that hours grew 1.95 percent per year for
the 1995–2000 period in the business sector while
our estimate is 2.24.
Our estimate of private domestic employee
hours is taken directly from the NIPA and includes
workers in the nonprofit sector, and the BLS esti-
mate does not. In addition, BLS (2001b) has revised
the growth in business sector hours in 2000 down-
ward by 0.4 percentage point on the basis of new
data from the 2000 Hours at Work Survey. Our
estimate of labor quality change is also slightly
1995–2000
less
1959–2000 1959–73 1973–95 1995–2000 1973–95
Output growth (Y) 3.61 4.24 2.99 4.60 1.61
Hours growth (H) 1.54 1.27 1.55 2.24 0.68
Average labor productivity growth (ALP) 2.07 2.97 1.44 2.36 0.92
Capital deepening 1.13 1.44 0.88 1.40 0.52
IT capital deepening 0.32 0.16 0.32 0.76 0.44
Other capital deepening 0.82 1.28 0.56 0.64 0.08
Labor quality 0.28 0.39 0.23 0.17 –0.06
TFP growth 0.66 1.13 0.33 0.80 0.47
IT-related contribution 0.23 0.10 0.24 0.51 0.27
Other contribution 0.43 1.03 0.08 0.29 0.20
Note: A contribution of an output or input is defined as the share-weighted, real growth rate.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BEA, BLS, Census Bureau, and other data
TABLE 2
Sources of Growth in Average Labor Productivity, 1959–20004. The assumption that output and the capital stock grow at the same rate is similar to a balanced growth path in a standard
growth model, but our actual data with many heterogeneous types of capital and labor inputs make this interpretation only
an approximation.
5. Reproducible assets include equipment, structures, consumer durable assets, and inventories but exclude land.
6. These unemployment rates are annual averages for the civilian labor force sixteen years and older from the BLS.
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We begin by decomposing the aggregate capital
stock into the reproducible component, ZR, and
business sector land, LAND, which we assume to be
fixed. This decomposition implies that
(8)
where u –
R is the value share of reproducible capital
stock in total capital stock.
We then employ our projection assumptions to
construct estimates of trend output and productivity
growth, which are conditional on the projected growth
of the remaining sources of economic growth. More
formally, if ∆lnY = ∆lnZR, then combining equations
3, 4, 7, and 8 implies that trend labor productivity
and output growth are given by
(9) ∆lny = [v –





IT∆ln AIT +lnAn]/(1–v –
Kµ –
R)
∆lnY = ∆lny + ∆lnH.
Equation 9 is a long-run relationship that averages
over cyclical and stochastic elements and removes
the transitional dynamics relating to capital accu-
mulation. The second part of a definition of trend
growth is that the unemployment rate remains con-
stant and hours growth matches labor force growth.
Growth in hours worked was exceptionally rapid in
the 1995–2000 period as the unemployment rate
fell from 5.6 percent in 1995 to 4 in 2000, so output
growth was considerably above its trend rate.6 To
estimate hours growth over the next decade, we
employ detailed demographic projections based on
Census Bureau data.
To complete intermediate-term growth projec-
tions based on equation 9 requires estimates of capi-
tal and labor shares, IT output shares, reproducible
capital stock shares, capital quality growth, labor
quality growth, and TFP growth. Labor quality growth
and the various shares are relatively easy to project,
but extrapolations of the other variables involve much
greater uncertainty. Accordingly, we present three
sets of projections—a base-case scenario, a pessimistic
scenario, and an optimistic scenario.
We hold labor quality growth, hours growth, the
capital share, the reproducible capital stock share,
∆∆ ∆
∆











and the IT output share constant across the three
scenarios and refer to these as the “common assump-
tions.” We vary IT-related TFP growth, the contri-
bution to TFP growth from non-IT sources, and
capital quality growth across these scenarios and
label them “alternative assumptions.” Generally
speaking for these variables, the base-case scenario
incorporates data from the 1990–2000 business
cycle, the optimistic scenario assumes the patterns
of the 1995–2000 period will persist, and the pes-
simistic case assumes that the economy reverts to
1973–95 averages.
Common assumptions. Hours growth (∆lnH)
and labor quality growth (∆lnLQ) are relatively
easy to project. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) (2001a), for example, projects growth in
the economywide labor force of 1.1 percent per
year based on Social Security Administration pro-
jections of population growth. Potential hours
growth is projected at 1.2 percent per year for the
nonfarm business sector for 2001–11 based on
CBO projections of hours worked for different
demographic categories of workers. The CBO esti-
mate of potential hours growth is a slight increase
from earlier projections due to incorporation of
recent data from the 2000 census and changes in
the tax laws that will modestly increase the sup-
ply of labor. The CBO (2001a) does not employ
the concept of labor quality. 
We construct our own projections of demographic
trends. Ho and Jorgenson (1999) have shown that
the dominant trends in labor quality growth are due
to rapid improvements in educational attainment in
the 1960s and 1970s and the rise in female partici-
pation rates in the 1970s. Although the average
educational level continued to rise as younger and
An important difficulty in projecting capital
quality growth from recent data is that invest-
ment patterns in the 1990s may partially reflect
an unsustainable investment boom in response
to temporary factors like Y2K investment and
the Nasdaq stock market bubble.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
period. We estimate that growth in labor quality
(∆lnLQ) will be 0.27 percent per year over the next
decade and 0.17 percent per year over the next two
decades. This estimate is considerably lower than the
0.49 percent growth rate for the 1959–2000 period,
which was driven by rising average educational
attainment and stabilizing female participation.
The capital share (v –
K) has not shown any obvi-
ous trend over the last forty years. We assume it
holds constant at 42.8 percent, the average for
1959–2000. Similarly, the fixed reproducible capital
share (µ –
R) has shown little trend, and we assume it
remains constant at 80.4 percent, the average for
1959–2000. 
We assume the IT output share (u –
IT) stays at 5.1
percent, the average for the 1995–2000 period. This
estimate is likely conservative because IT has steadily
increased in importance in the U.S. economy, rising
from 2.1 percent of output in 1970 to 2.7 percent in
1980, 3.9 percent in 1990, and 5.7 percent in 2000.
On the other hand, there has been speculation that
IT expenditures in the late 1990s were not sustain-
able because of Y2K investment, the Nasdaq bubble,
and abnormally rapid price declines.8
Alternative assumptions. IT-related produc-
tivity growth (∆lnAIT) has been extremely rapid
in recent years with a substantial acceleration
after 1995. For the 1990–95 period productivity
growth for production of the three IT assets aver-
aged 7.4 percent per year while the 1995–2000 aver-
age growth rate was 10.3 percent. These growth
rates are high but quite consistent with industry-
level productivity estimates for high-tech sectors.
For example, BLS (2001a) reports productivity
growth of 6.9 percent per year for the 1995–99
period in industrial and commercial machinery,
which includes production of computer hardware,
and 8.1 percent in electronic and other electric
equipment, which includes semiconductors and
telecommunications equipment. 
Jorgenson (2001) argues that the large increase
in IT productivity growth was triggered by a much
sharper acceleration in the decline of semiconduc-
tor prices that can be traced to a shift in the prod-
uct cycle for semiconductors in 1995 from three
years to two years, a consequence of intensifying
competition in the semiconductor market. It would
be premature to extrapolate the recent acceleration
in productivity growth into the indefinite future,
however, because this depends on the persistence
of a two-year product cycle for semiconductors.
To better gauge the future prospects of techno-
logical progress in the semiconductor industry, we
turn to the International Technology Roadmap
better-educated workers entered the labor force
and older workers retired, the improvement in edu-
cational attainment of new entrants into the labor
force largely ceased in the 1990s. 
Growth in the population is projected from the
Bureau of the Census demographic model, which
breaks the population down by individual year of
age, race, and sex.7 For each group, the population
in period t is equal to the population in period t – 1,
less deaths plus net immigration. Death rates are
group-specific and are projected by assuming a
steady rate of improvement in health. The popula-
tion of newborns in each period reflects the number
of females in each age group and the age- and race-
specific fertility rates. These fertility rates are pro-
jected to fall steadily.
We observe labor force participation rates in the
last year of our sample period and then project the
work force by assuming constant participation rates
for each sex-age group. The educational attainment
of workers aged α in period t is projected by assum-
ing that it is equal to the attainment of the workers
of age α – 1 in period t – 1 for all those who are over
thirty-five years old in the last year of the sample.
For those who are younger than thirty-five, we
assume that the educational attainment of workers
aged α in forecast period t is equal to the attain-
ment of workers aged α in the base year.
The index of labor quality is constructed from
hours worked and compensation rates. We project
hours worked by multiplying the projected popula-
tion in each sex-age-education group by the annual
hours worked per person in the last year of the sam-
ple. The relative compensation rates for each group
are assumed to be equal to the observed compensa-
tion in the sample period. With these projected
hours and compensation we forecast the quality
index over the next twenty years.
Our estimates suggest that hours growth (∆lnH)
will be about 1.1 percent per year over the next ten
years, which is quite close to the CBO (2001a) esti-
mates, and 0.8 percent per year over a twenty-year
Our optimistic scenario puts labor productivity
growth just below 3 percent per year and
reflects the assumption of continuing rapid
technological progress.7. See Bureau of the Census (2000) for details of the population model.
8. See McCarthy (2001) for determinants of investment in the late 1990s.
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for Semiconductors (2000). This projection, per-
formed annually by a consortium of industry associ-
ations, forecasts a two-year product cycle through
2003 and a three-year product cycle thereafter. The
Roadmap is a reasonable basis for projecting the
IT-related productivity growth of the U.S. economy.
Moreover, continuation of a two-year cycle provides
an upper bound for growth projections while rever-
sion to a three-year cycle gives a lower bound.
Our base-case scenario follows the Roadmap
and averages the two-year and three-year cycle pro-
jections with IT-related growth of 8.8 percent per
year, which equals the average for the 1990–2000
period. The optimistic projections assume that the
two-year product cycle for semiconductors remains
in place over the intermediate future so that pro-
ductivity growth in the production of IT assets aver-
ages 10.3 percent per year, as it did for 1995–2000.
The pessimistic projection assumes the semicon-
ductor product cycle reverts to the three-year cycle
in place during the 1973–95 period when IT-related
productivity growth was 7.4 percent per year. In all
cases, the contribution of IT to aggregate TFP
growth reflects the 1995–2000 average share of
about 5.1 percent.
The TFP contribution from non-IT sources (∆ An)
is more difficult to project because the post-1995
acceleration is outside of standard growth models.
Therefore, we present a range of alternative esti-
mates that are consistent with the historical record.
The base case uses the average contribution from
the full business cycle of the 1990s and assumes a
contribution of 0.2 percentage point for the inter-
mediate future. This base case assumes that the
myriad of factors that drove TFP growth in the
1990s—such as technological progress, innovation,
resource reallocations, and increased competitive
pressures—will continue into the future. The opti-
mistic case assumes that the contribution for
1995–2000 of 0.29 percentage point per year will
continue for the intermediate future while our pes-
simistic case assumes that the U.S. economy will
revert to the slow-growth 1973–95 period, when
this contribution averaged only 0.08 percent per year.
The final step in our projections is to estimate
the growth in capital quality (∆lnKQ). The work-
horse aggregate growth model with one capital
good has capital stock and output growing at the
same rate in a balanced growth equilibrium, and
even complex models typically have only two capital
goods. The U.S. data, however, distinguish between
several dozen types of capital, and the historical
record shows that substitution between these types
of capital is an important source of output and pro-
ductivity growth. For 1959–2000, for example, cap-
ital quality growth contributed 0.47 percentage
point to output growth as firms substituted toward
short-lived assets with higher marginal products.
This contribution corresponds to a growth in capital
quality of about 1 percent per year.
An important difficulty in projecting capital quality
growth from recent data, however, is that investment
patterns in the 1990s may partially reflect an unsus-
tainable investment boom in response to temporary
factors like Y2K investment and the Nasdaq stock
market bubble, which skewed investment toward IT
assets. Capital quality for the 1995–2000 period grew
at 2.5 percent per year as firms invested heavily in IT,
for example, but there has been a sizable slowdown
in IT investment in the second half of 2000 and in
2001. Therefore, we are cautious about relying too
heavily on the recent investment experience.
The base case again uses the average rate for
1990–2000, which was 1.75 percentage points for
capital quality; this rate effectively averages the high
substitution rates in the late 1990s with the more
moderate rates of the early 1990s and uses evidence
from the complete business cycle of the 1990s. The
optimistic projection ignores the belief that capital
substitution was unsustainably high in the late 1990s
and assumes that capital quality growth will continue
at the 2.45 percent annual rate of the 1995–2000
period. Our pessimistic scenario assumes that the
growth of capital quality reverts to the 0.84 percent
annual growth rate seen for the 1973–95 period.
Output and productivity projections. Table 3
assembles the components of the projections and
presents the three scenarios. The top section shows
the projected growth of output, labor productivity,
and the effective capital stock. The middle section
Our primary conclusion is that a consensus
has emerged about trend rates of growth for
output and labor productivity.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
put shares. Other TFP growth also makes a smaller
contribution. Finally, the slower pace of capital input
growth is offset by slower hours growth so that strong
capital deepening brings the projected growth rate
near the observed rates of growth for 1995–2000.
Our optimistic scenario puts labor productivity
growth just below 3 percent per year and reflects
the assumption of continuing rapid technological
progress. In particular, the two-year product cycle
in semiconductors is assumed to persist for the
intermediate future, driving rapid TFP in produc-
tion of IT assets as well as continued substitution
toward IT assets and rapid growth in capital quality.
In addition, other TFP growth continues the rela-
tively rapid contribution seen after 1995.
Finally, the pessimistic projection of 1.33 per-
cent annual growth in labor productivity assumes
that many trends revert to the sluggish growth rates
of the 1973–95 period and that the three-year prod-
uct cycle for semiconductors begins immediately.
The larger share of IT, however, means that even
with the return to the three-year technology cycle
and slower TFP growth, labor productivity growth
will equal the rates seen in the 1970s and 1980s.
Alternative Methodologies and Estimates
T
his section briefly reviews alternative approaches
to estimating productivity growth trends from
reports the five factors that are held constant across
scenarios—hours growth, labor quality growth, the
capital share, the IT output share, and the repro-
ducible capital stock share. The bottom section
includes the three components that vary across
scenarios—TFP growth in IT, the TFP contribution
from other sources, and capital quality growth.
Table 3 also compares the projections with actual
data for the same series for 1995–2000.
The base-case scenario puts trend labor produc-
tivity growth at 2.21 percent per year and trend
output growth at 3.31 percent per year. Projected
productivity growth falls just short of our estimates
for the 1995–2000 period, but output growth is con-
siderably slower due to the large slowdown in pro-
jected hours growth; hours grew 2.24 percent per
year for the 1995–2000 period compared to our pro-
jection of only 1.1 percent per year for the next
decade. Capital stock growth is projected to fall in
the base case to 2.66 percent per year from 2.94
percent for the 1995–2000 period.
Our base-case scenario incorporates the underly-
ing pace of technological progress in semiconductors
embedded in the Roadmap forecast and puts the
contribution of IT-related TFP below that of the
1995–2000 period as the semiconductor industry
eventually returns to a three-year product cycle. The
slower growth is partially balanced by larger IT out-
Scenarios
1995–2000 Pessimistic Base-Case Optimistic
Projections
Output growth 4.60 2.43 3.31 4.02
ALP growth 2.36 1.33 2.21 2.92
Effective capital stock 2.94 1.96 2.66 3.23
Common assumptions
Hours growth 2.240 1.100 1.100 1.100
Labor quality growth 0.299 0.265 0.265 0.265
Capital share 0.438 0.428 0.428 0.428
IT output share 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051
Reproducible capital stock share 0.798 0.804 0.804 0.804
Alternative assumptions
TFP growth in IT 10.33 7.39 8.78 10.28
Implied IT-related TFP contribution 0.52 0.37 0.44 0.52
Other TFP contribution 0.29 0.08 0.20 0.29
Capital quality growth 2.45 0.84 1.75 2.45
Notes: In all projections, hours growth and labor quality growth are from internal projections, capital share and reproducible capital stock
shares are 1959–2000 averages, and IT output shares are for 1995–2000. The pessimistic case uses 1973–95 average growth of capital qual-
ity, IT-related TFP growth, and non-IT TFP contribution. The base case uses 1990–2000 averages, and the optimistic case uses 1995–2000
averages. 
TABLE 3
Output and Labor Productivity Projections9. Both Roberts (2001) and French (2001) employ the Stock and Watson (1998) method of dealing with the zero bias.
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the historical record and projecting productivity
growth going forward. We begin with the econo-
metric methods for separating trend and cyclical
components of productivity growth employed by
Gordon (2000), French (2001), and Roberts (2001).
A second approach is to control for factors that
are most likely to be cyclical, such as factor uti-
lization, in the augmented growth accounting
framework of Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001).
In a third approach, the CBO (2001a, 2001b) cali-
brates a growth model to the historical record and
uses the model to project growth of output and
productivity. Finally, Oliner and Sichel (2002) pre-
sent a projection methodology based on a growth
accounting framework; this paper appears in this
issue of the Economic Review and is not discussed
in detail here.
Econometric estimates. We begin with the
studies that employ econometric methods for
decomposing a single time series between cyclical
and trend components. Gordon (2000) estimates
that of the 2.75 percent annual labor productivity
growth rate during the 1995–99 period, 0.5 percent
can be attributed to cyclical effects and 2.25 per-
cent to trend. The post-1995 trend growth rate is
0.83 percent higher than the growth rate in the
1972–95 period. Capital and labor input growth and
price measurement changes account for 0.52 per-
cent, and TFP growth in the computer sector
accounts for 0.29 percent, leaving a mere 0.02 per-
cent to be explained by acceleration in TFP growth
in the other sectors of the private economy. In this
view the productivity revival is concentrated in the
computer-producing sector.
Other studies have employed state-space models
to distinguish between trend and cycles for output.
Roberts (2001) uses time-varying parameter meth-
ods to model the growth of labor and total factor
productivity. He represents trend productivity as a
random walk with drift and allows the drift term to
be a time-varying parameter. These estimates suggest
that trend labor productivity growth has increased
from 1.6 percent per year during the 1973–94 period
to 2.7 percent by 2000 while trend TFP growth rose
from 0.5 percent during the 1985–95 period to 1.1 per-
cent during the 1998–2000 period. This estimate of
trend labor productivity falls between our base-case
and optimistic projections.
French (2001) uses a Cobb-Douglas production
function to model trends and cycles in total factor
productivity growth. He considers filtering methods
and concludes that they are all unsatisfactory
because of the assumption that innovations are nor-
mally distributed.9 He applies a discrete innovations
model with two high-low TFP growth regimes and
finds that the trend TFP growth after 1995 increases
from 1.01 percent to 1.11 percent.
Finally, Hansen (2001) provides a good primer on
recent advances in the alternatives to random walk
models—testing for infrequent structural breaks in
parameters. Applying these methods to the U.S.
manufacturing sector, he finds strong evidence of a
break in labor productivity in the mid-1990s, the
break date depending on the sector being analyzed.
We do not compare his specific estimates because
they are only for manufacturing.
Augmented growth accounting. Basu, Fernald,
and Shapiro (2001) present an alternative approach
to estimating trend growth in total factor produc-
tivity by separately accounting for factor utilization
and factor accumulation. They extend the growth
accounting framework to incorporate adjustment
costs, scale economies, imperfect competition, and
changes in utilization. Industry-level data for the
1990s suggest that the post-1995 rise in productivity
appears to be largely a change in trend rather than
a cyclical phenomenon since there was little change
in utilization in the late 1990s. While Basu, Fernald,
and Shapiro are clear that they do not make predic-
tions about the sustainability of these changes, their
results suggest that any slowdown in investment
growth is likely to be associated with a temporary
increase in output growth as resources are reallo-
cated away from adjustment and toward production.
Calibration and projection. The CBO (2001a)
presents medium-term projections for economic
growth and productivity for the 2003–11 period for
both the overall economy and the nonfarm business
sector. The CBO’s most fully developed model is for
the nonfarm business sector. Medium-term projec-
tions are based on historical trends in the labor
force, savings and investment, and TFP growth.
Our second conclusion is that trend growth
rates are subject to considerable uncertainty.
For the U.S. economy this can be identified with
the future product cycle for semiconductors
and the impact on other high-tech gear.10. See CBO (2001b) for details. Note also that the CBO assumes a capital share of 0.3, which is substantially smaller than our
estimate of 0.43.
11. Note that our output concept is slightly different so the estimates are not directly comparable. Nonetheless, the broad pre-
dictions are similar.
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reproducible capital are the same and that hours
growth is constrained by the growth of the labor
force to form a balanced growth path. While pro-
ductivity is projected to fall slightly from the pace
seen in late 1990s, we conclude that the U.S. pro-
ductivity revival is likely to remain intact for the
intermediate future.
Our second conclusion is that trend growth rates
are subject to considerable uncertainty. For the U.S.
economy this can be identified with the future
product cycle for semiconductors and the impact
on other high-tech gear. The switch from a three-
year to a two-year product cycle in 1995 produced
a dramatic increase in the rate of decline of IT
prices. This is reflected in the investment boom of
the 1995–2000 period and the massive substitution
of IT capital for other types of capital that took
place in response to price changes. The issue that
must be confronted by policymakers is whether this
two-year product cycle can continue and whether
firms will continue to respond to the dramatic
improvements in the performance/price ratio of IT
investment goods.
As a final point, we have not tried to quantify
another important source of uncertainty, namely,
the economic impacts of the events of September 11.
These impacts are already apparent in the slow-
down of economic activity in areas related to travel
and increased security as well as higher govern-
ment expenditures for the war in Afghanistan and
enhanced homeland security. The cyclical effects
will likely produce only a temporary reduction in
productivity as civilian plants operate at lower uti-
lization rates. Even a long-term reallocation of
resources from civilian to public goods or to secu-
rity operations, however, should produce only a
one-time reduction in productivity levels rather
than a change in the trend rate of growth of out-
put and productivity. 
These projections allow for possible business cycle
fluctuations, but the CBO does not explicitly fore-
cast fluctuations beyond two years (CBO 2001a, 38).
For the nonfarm part of the economy, the CBO
(2001a) projects potential output growth of 3.7 per-
cent per year and potential labor productivity of
2.5 percent per year. For the economy as a whole,
the CBO projects potential labor productivity growth
of 2.1 percent per year, which is quite close to our
estimates.
For the nonfarm business economy, the CBO
(2001a) utilizes a Cobb-Douglas production function
without labor quality improvement. The CBO’s rela-
tively high projection of labor productivity growth
for the nonfarm business sector reflects projections
of capital input growth of 4.8 percent per year and
TFP growth of 1.4 percent per year.10 The CBO’s
relatively rapid rate of capital input growth going
forward is somewhat slower than their estimate of
5.2 percent for the 1996–2000 period but consider-
ably faster than their estimate of 3.9 percent annual
growth for the 1990–2000 period. These estimates
reflect the model of savings and investment used by
the CBO as well as the expectation of continued
substitution toward short-lived IT assets. Potential
TFP growth of 1.4 percent per year reflects an esti-
mated trend growth of 1.1 percent per year aug-
mented by the specific effects of computer quality
improvement and changes in price measurement.
Conclusion
O
ur primary conclusion is that a consensus has
emerged about trend rates of growth for out-
put and labor productivity. Our central estimates of
2.21 percent for labor productivity and 3.31 percent
for output are very similar to those of Gordon
(2000) and the CBO (2001a) and only slightly more
optimistic than Baily’s (2001).11 Our methodology
assumes that trend growth rates in output and13 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2002
Aizcorbe, Ana. 2002. Why are semiconductor prices
falling so fast? Industry estimates and implications for
productivity measurement. Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, February. Photocopy.
Baily, Martin Neal. 2001. Macroeconomic implications of
the new economy. In Economic policy for the informa-
tion economy, the proceedings of a symposium presented
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson
Hole, Wyo., August 30.
Basu, Susanto, John G. Fernald, and Matthew G. Shapiro.
2001. Productivity growth in the 1990s: Technology, uti-
lization, or adjustment? Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy 55 (December): 117–65.
Bureau of the Census. 2000. Methodology and assump-
tions for the population projections of the United States:
1999 to 2100. <www.census.gov/population/www/
projections/natproj.html> (November 2001).
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2001a. Multifactor pro-
ductivity trends, 1999. USDL 01-125, May 3.
———. 2001b. Productivity and costs, third quarter
2001. USDL 01-452, December 6.
———. 2002. Productivity and costs, fourth quarter and
annual averages, 2001. USDL 02-123, March 7.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2001a. The budget
and economic outlook: An update. Washington, D.C.:
GPO.
———. 2001b. CBO’s method for estimating potential
output: An update. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). 2001. Annual report
of the Council of Economic Advisers. In Economic report
of the president. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
DeLong, J. Bradford, and Lawrence M. Summers. 2001.
The “new economy”: Background, historical perspective,
questions, and speculation. In Economic policy for the
information economy, the proceedings of a symposium
presented by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 30. 
French, Mark W. 2001. Estimating change in trend growth
of total factor productivity: Kalman and H-P filters versus
a Markov-switching framework. Board of Governors of 
the Federal System, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series 2001-44.
Gordon, Robert J. 2000. Does the “New Economy” mea-
sure up to the great inventions of the past? Journal of
Economic Perspectives 14 (Fall): 49–74.
Hansen, Bruce E. 2001. The new econometrics of struc-
tural change: Dating breaks in U.S. labor productivity.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (Fall): 117–28.
Herman, Shelby W. 2001. Fixed assets and consumer
durables for 1925–2000. Survey of Current Business
(September): 27–38.
Ho, Mun, and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1999. The quality of the
U.S. workforce 1948–95. Harvard University, Kennedy
School of Government Paper, February.
Hobijn, Bart. 2001. Is equipment price deflation a statis-
tical artifact? Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Report 139, November.
International technology roadmap for semiconductors,
2000 update. 2000. Austin, Tex.: Sematech Corporation.
<http://public.itrs.net> (October 2001).
Jorgenson, Dale W. 1996. The embodiment hypothesis.
In Postwar U.S. economic growth. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press.
———. 2001. Information technology and the U.S. econ-
omy. American Economic Review 91 (March): 1–32.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Zvi Griliches. 1996. The expla-
nation of productivity change. In Postwar U.S. economic
growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Jorgenson, Dale W., Mun S. Ho, and Kevin J. Stiroh. 2002.
Productivity and labor quality in U.S. industries. Prepared
for NBER/CRIW Conference on Measurement of Capital
in the New Economy, April.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Kevin J. Stiroh. 2000. Raising
the speed limit: U.S. economic growth in the information
age. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 125–211. 
McCarthy, Jonathan. 2001. Equipment expenditures since
1995: The boom and the bust. Current Issues in Eco-
nomics and Finance 7 (October): 1–6.
Oliner, Stephen D., and Daniel E. Sichel. 2000. The
resurgence of growth in the late 1990s: Is information
technology the story? Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 14 (Fall): 3–22.
———. 2002. Information technology and productivity:
Where are we now and where are we going? Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 87 (Third
Quarter): 15–44.
Roberts, John M. 2001. Estimates of the productivity
trend using time-varying parameter techniques. Board
of Governors of the Federal System, Finance and Eco-
nomics Discussion Series 2001-8.
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 1998. Median un-
biased estimation of coefficient variance in a time-varying
parameter model. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 93 (March): 349–58.
REFERENCES